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REsuMEN: Este trabajo realiza un análisis crítico de la concepción, por primera vez, del em-
brión humano en el Derecho de la Unión con la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de 18 de 
octubre de 2011, en el asunto C-34/10.Estas consideraciones son hechas para dar cuenta 
de la Decisión de la Oficina Europea de Patentes de 25 de noviembre de 2008, en el caso 
de WARF, los dictámenes del Grupo Europeo de Ética en Ciencia y Nuevas Tecnologías, así 
como de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos.
Palabras clave: Derecho europeo de patentes biológicas, Concepto de embrión humano, 
Respeto del principio de la dignidad humana en los embriones, Bioética, Embriones somáti-
cos.
AbsTRACT: This paper provides a critical analysis of the design, for the first time, of the hu-
man embryo in the EU law with the judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 October 2011 in 
Case C-34/10. These considerations are made to account for the decision of the European 
Patent Office on November 25, 2008, in the WARF case, the opinions of the European Group 
on Ethics in Science and New Technologies and the case-law of the European Court of Hu-
man rights.
Descriptors: Legal protection of biotechnological inventions in European Union Law, Con-
cept of human embryo, Respect for the principle of human dignity in human embryos, Bio-
ethics, Somatic Embryos.
REsuMé: Ce travail fait un analysis critique de la conceptualisation, par première fois, de 
l’embryon humain dans la Droit de l’Union avec le jugement de la Cour de Justice de 18 
Octobre 2011, dans l’affaire C-34/10. Cettes considerations critiques sont faits par rapport 
la Decision du Bureau Européen des Patents de 25.11.2008, dans l’affaire WARF, les opinions 
du Groupe Européen d’Éthique dans les Sciences et les Nouvelles Technologies, ainsi comme 
par rapport la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme.
Mots-clés: Droit Européen de patents biologiques, Embryon humain, Dignité humain des 
embryos humains, Bioéthic, L’embryon somatic.
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I. INTRODuCTION: bIOTECHNOLOgICAL PATENTs IN A CONTEXT Of 
EuROPEAN PLuRALIsM As REgARDs THE MORALs uNDERLyINg THE 
REsEARCH ON HuMAN EMbRyOs
As a matter of principle, Since its early start in the 70’s, the research 
conducted on Human Embryos —originally in the context of IVF tech-
niques— has been conditioned by the discussion on the ontological and 
ethical status of the Human Embryo. As far the former, it is possible to 
identify up to four feelings: a) Human Embryo being a person (actu-
ally, it is the first stage of any human being); b) Human Embryo being a 
thing (that is, a ball of cells lacking any specific qualification); c) Human 
Embryo being an intermediate reality, neither a person nor a thing; and 
finally, d) the so called “demiurgic position” facing the Human Embryo 
under which, we do not know what it exactly is.1 Concerning the lat-
ter, it is also possible to find out three approaches to the moral value of 
the Human Embryo: a) it has the same moral value than a person; b) it 
lacks any moral value; and c) it is an object entitled to a specific legal 
protection which can be modulated on the basis of the way it has been 
created, the stage of its development and the purposes aimed at its use.2
The controversy around the research conducted on Human Embryos 
shows two opponents, following to SALLES. On the one hand there are 
those focusing their arguments on the potential harms and goods for 
human beings (including the own Human Embryos or born people suf-
fering from serious maladies); on the other hand there are those stress-
ing the social and cultural value of this field of research, independently 
of its eventual benefits for the society.3
A wide study in major academic works4 leads us to conclude —co-
inciding with Professor ABEL I FABRE— that “indeed, there are very 
1 Bellver Capella, V., “Células madre, genes y clones: el sendero del posthumanismo”, in 
Zurriaraín, R. G. (coord.), Células madre, Ciencia, Ética y Derecho, Madrid, Ediciones Internac-
ionales Universitarias, 2009, p. 149.
2 Ibidem, p. 150.
3 Salles, A. L. F., “La clonación y el debate sobre células troncales”, in Luna, F. and Salles, 
A. L. F. (coords.), Bioética: nuevas reflexiones sobre debates clásicos, Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultu-
ra Económica, 2008, p. 338.
4 See, at this point, Ollero, A., “El estatuto jurídico del embrión humano”, in Biotecnología 
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few of these scientists, philosophers or theologians ready to interpret 
scientific data in a way allowing them to re-consider their own schemes 
of thought”.5 This author also concludes saying: “in this controversy 
around the research with Human Embryos we have so many convictions 
but so little dialogue”.6
In this article we focus our attention on the discussion around the 
Human Embryo up to the 14th day after fertilisation. The dialectic sur-
rounding this issue confronting two visions, that from a materialistic re-
ductivism7 and that defending the status of person for Human Embryos 
from the moment of conception,8 would seem to us to have reached 
some kind of intermediate position, in the search of an universal and 
inclusive concept of person. This attempt would stress the idea of vul-
nerability and it could allow to consider a human person notwithstand-
ing his/her evolutive stage and different health conditions.9 This concil-
iatory approach is clearly evidenced in the judgment of 18th October, 
2011 of the Court of Justice in the case c-34/10. Nevertheless, as we 
consider in this pages, the European Judge and the European Legislator 
have not wanted to handle a “hot potato”, namely, the key question in 
this issue: how the European Law could (and indeed should) manage the 
y posthumanismo, Ballesteros, J., and Fernández, E., (coords), Thomson Aranzadi, 2007, Cizur 
Menor, pp. 331 and ff.
5 Abel i Fabre, F., Bioética: orígenes, presente y futuro, Madrid, Institut Borja and MAPFRE 
Foundation, 2007, p. 139.
6 Ibidem.
7 See, inter alia, Singer, P., Ética Práctica, Barcelona, Akal, 2009, pp. 161-162. Savulescu, J., 
¿Decisiones peligrosas? Una bioética desafiante, Madrid, Tecnos, 2012.
8 See, inter alia, Bellver, V., “Razones para el rechazo de la clonación con fines de 
investigación biomédica”, Cuadernos de Bioética, 2002, 1, pp. 75-86. Ballesteros, J., “Exigencias 
de dignidad humana en biojurídica”, in Manual de Bioética, Barcelona, Ariel, 2001, pp. 351-
374.
9  Torralba Roselló, F., ¿Qué es la dignidad humana? Ensayo sobre Peter Singer, Hugo Tristam 
Engelhardt y John Harris, Barcelona, Herder, 2005, p. 397. In opinion of this author, rather 
than defining a person on the basis of his/her external characteristics and habilities like the 
thought, we should focus on a definition which departs from its essential vulnerable condition, 
with a genesis, a development and an ending. Across this whole process, any person should be 
considered as such and consequently, he/she should be respected.
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obvious diversity of positions currently existing in the European society 
regarding the beginning of human life?10
The patentability of inventions in Europe is ruled by different prem-
ises than those accepted in United States, being one of the main differ-
ences between both patent regimes that in Europe patent of biotechno-
logical inventions are not allowed if it is estimated that it is in conflict 
with the public order or morality of one of the European countries.11
Actions brought for the annulment of the patent in Europe on the 
grounds of public order and morality is not new. The American Biocyte 
Corporation —latter integrated in Avicord— got the European patent 
EP 343.217 on blood cells from umbilical cords of the foetus and the 
new born child. Civil society groups in Europe challenged that patent 
because they considered it to be against moral and public order. On 
June 1999, the European Patent Office revoked its previous decision 
without any mention to public order consideration but it was justified 
as not including any “new invention”. Some months later, the same Eu-
ropean Patent Office granted the patent EP 0695351 to the University 
of Edinburgh and the Australian company Stem Cell Sciences to isolate, 
select and reproduce transgenic animal stem cells. On 24 July 2002 the 
patent was revoked due to a mistake: according to the application, the 
patent granted would include also human beings —as not having been 
specified non-human animals—. Again, it was a lot of pressure on the 
European Patent Office under moral and public order considerations 
which made it change its previous decision.
One could wonder then and later how persuasive  moral and public 
order considerations can be to bring an action against a patent granted 
10  Soto Silva, R., “El derecho y la interpretación de los hechos biológicos: dos ejemplos de 
la actualidad (células madre y clonación), Revista de Derecho (Valdivia), vol. XIII, 2002, p. 75.
11  See Opinion No. 16 of the European Group of Ethics for Sciences and New Technologies to the 
European Commission (from now on “The European Group of Ethics”) on The ethical aspects of 
patenting inventions involving human stem cells, pp. 9 and 10. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/
bepa/european-group-ethics/publications/opinions/index_en.htm (visited the 4th May 2012). The 
concept of public order (ordre public) implies the respect of human dignity which is in the root 
of human rights, as it is redacted in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. The European Convention of Patents of 1973 (Munich Convention) makes a 
reference to the public order in Article 53 and the Directive 98/44 of 6 July 1998 also makes 
mentions to morality and public order in Article 6.
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on human embryonic cells. This question seems to have found an an-
swer in the judgment of 18 October 2011, in the Case C-34/10 Oliver 
Brüstle v Greenpeace eV where the Court of Justice, for the very first time, 
has provided the concepts of ‘human embryo’ and ‘use for industrial 
or commercial purposes’ in the European Union Law. In the following 
pages I will focus on the relevance of such conceptualisation in the Law 
of the European Union by identifying its lights (e.g. its innovative ap-
proach in comparison to previous Opinions from the European Group 
on Ethics and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights) 
and its shadows.
II. THE uP-TO-NOW AuTHORIzED DOCTRINE ON THE TOPIC: 
THE EuROPEAN gROuP ON ETHICs (EgE) OPINION NO. 16 
ON THE ETHICAL AsPECTs Of PATENTINg INvENTIONs INvOLvINg 
HuMAN sTEM CELLs
Relying on Article 7 of Directive 98/44/EC,12 6 July 1998, on the juridi-
cal protection of biotechnological inventions, the European Group on Ethics 
redacted its Opinion No. 16, on the ethical aspects of patenting inventions 
involving human stem cells where it enounced some guidelines on the is-
sue of patenting biotechnological inventions which latter were closely 
followed by the European Patent Office in its decision on the so called 
WARF case.13 Concerning ethical aspects of patents involving human em-
bryonic stem cells, the European Group on Ethics was concerned that 
the questions of the dignity and the moral status of the embryo re-
main indeed highly controversial in a pluralistic society as the European 
Union. Those who are opposed to human embryo research, cannot, a 
fortiori, consider any patenting in that field. Among those who consider 
research on embryos ethically acceptable, some may feel great reluc-
tance towards patenting the resulting inventions, while others consider 
12 Official Journal L 213, 30/07/1998, pp. 13-21.
13 Main Board of Appellation (“EBoA”) of the European Patent Office decision of 25 
November 2008 in the so called WARF case. See infra Section IV.1.
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patenting inventions derived from embryo research as acceptable, espe-
cially given the potential medical benefits.14 
In the European context of incertitude as regards the relevance of 
ethical consideration when patenting biotechnological invention imply-
ing Human Embryos, the European Group on Ethics did not expressly 
said it was ethically acceptable nor the contrary to patent such inven-
tions.15 It is interesting to note what the European Group on Ethics 
said as regarding cloning in the context of patents. It started by re-
membering that under Article 6.2 of Directive 98/44/EC, processes 
of cloning human beings are not patentable. According to the definition 
of cloning in paragraph 41 of the Preamble of this Directive, it seems 
open to question —and it was so confirmed by the European Group on 
Ethics— whether the ban on patents reaches only reproductive human 
cloning or it also includes the cloning of human stem cells for therapeu-
tic purposes. The scientific procedure is similar in reproductive cloning 
and for therapeutical purposes but the opposition on the grounds of 
moral and public order in Europe is far different in both cases. The Eu-
ropean Group on Ethics was cautious enough in this issue. It evoked its 
previous Opinion No. 15, of 14 November 2000, On research with human 
stem cells where it had already taken note of the strong ethical concern 
in Europe as regards the cloning of human stem cells. Consequently, in 
its Opinion No. 16, the European Group on Ethics recommended to 
prevent someone from patenting processes of creation of human em-
bryos by way of cloning stem cells and at the same time emphasized the 
urgent necessity of opening a public discussion on this question.16
14 Opinion No. 16 of the European Group of Ethics on The ethical aspects of patenting inventions 
involving human stem cells, op. cit., p. 13.
15 Even inside the European Group of Ethics was impossible to reach a consensus on this topic 
when Opinion No. 16 on the ethical aspects of patenting inventions involving human stem cells was 
redacted. It was needed to include the dissident opinion of Professor Günter VIRT.: “Human 
embryonic stem cells are excluded from patentability because we cannot get embryonic stem 
cell lines without destroying an embryo and that means without use of embryos.”
16 EGE, Opinion No. 16, op. cit., p. 17. 
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III. THE REvOLuTIONARy CHANgE INTRODuCED by THE juDgEMENT 
Of THE COuRT Of jusTICE Of 18 OCTObER 2011 
IN THE CAsE C-34/10 , OLIvER bRüsTLE v gREENPEACE Ev
The facts in this case are the following: Mr Brüstle was the holder of a 
German patent which concerned isolated and purified neural precursor 
cells, processes for their production from embryonic stem cells and the 
use of neural precursor cells for the treatment of neural defects. It is 
claimed in the patent specification filed by Mr Brüstle that the trans-
plantation of brain cells into the nervous system allows the treatment 
of numerous neurological diseases.17 In order to remedy such neural 
defects, it is necessary to transplant immature precursor cells. This type 
of cell exists only during the brain’s development phase, nevertheless 
the use of cerebral tissue from human embryos rises significant ethical 
questions and the previous ruling of the EBoA, 25 November 2008, in 
the WARF Case, made in practice very difficult for Mr Brüstle to be 
granted an European patent for such transplant of immature precur-
sor cells. On the contrary, Mr Brüstle focused on the embryonic stem 
cells which offered him new prospects for the production of cells for 
transplantation. Thus, Mr Brüstle’s invention made it possible, among 
other things, to resolve the technical problem of producing an almost 
unlimited quantity of isolated and purified precursor cells having neural 
or glial properties, obtained from embryonic stem cells.
Greenpeace eV brought an action for the annulment of the patent 
filed by Mr Brüstle in so far as certain claims under that patent concern 
precursor cells obtained from human embryonic stem cells. It consid-
ered that Mr Brüstle’s invention was unpatentable under Article 2 of 
the Law on Patents, in the version in force on 28 February 2005. The 
Bundespatentgericht (Federal Patent Court) allowed in part the appli-
cation made by Greenpeace and declared the patent filed by Mr Brüstle 
invalid in so far the first claim relating to precursor cells obtained from 
human embryonic stem cells and the twelfth and sixteenth claims re-
17 In fact, the first clinical applications have already been developed, in particular for 
patients suffering from Parkinson’s disease.
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lating to processes for the production of precursor cells. Mr Brüstle 
appealed against that judgment at the referring court and that Court 
-considering that the outcome of the proceedings depended on the in-
terpretation of certain provisions of Directive 98/44- asked the Euro-
pean Court of Justice the following questions: 
1. What is meant by the term “human embryos” in Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 
98/44 ...?
(a) Does it include all stages of the development of human life, beginning with 
the fertilisation of the ovum, or must further requirements, such as the attain-
ment of a certain stage of development, be satisfied?
(b) Are the following organisms also included:
– unfertilised human ova into which a cell nucleus from a mature human cell 
has been transplanted;
– unfertilised human ova whose division and further development have been 
stimulated by parthenogenesis?
(c)Are stem cells obtained from human embryos at the blastocyst stage also 
included? 
2. What is meant by the expression “uses of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes”? Does it include any commercial exploitation within the 
meaning of Article 6(1) of [Directive 98/44], especially use for the purposes of 
scientific research?
3. Is technical teaching to be considered unpatentable pursuant to Article 6(2)
(c) of the Directive even if the use of human embryos does not form part of the 
technical teaching claimed with the patent, but is a necessary precondition for the 
application of that teaching
(a) because the patent concerns a product whose production necessitates the 
prior destruction of human embryos,
(b) or because the patent concerns a process for which such a product is nee-
ded as base material?
This way, for the very first time, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union faced the concept “uses of human embryos for industrial or com-
mercial purposes” within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 
98/44. In the conclusions provided by the General Advocate —Mr. 
Yves BOT— on 11 March 2011, the view taken is that the concept of 
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a human embryo must have a Community understanding.18 Contrary to 
the opinion of States that the definition of this concept had to be left 
solely to their discretion —as in fact has assumed the European Group 
on Ethics in its referred Opinion No. 16 and assumed by the European 
Court of Human Rights— the Court of Justice followed a surprisingly 
brief reasoning to conclude a Community understanding for the ques-
tions asked by the Bundesgerichtshof and thus ruled, as regards the first 
of those, that Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 6 July of 1998 on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions must be interpreted as meaning that:
 – any human ovum after fertilisation,any non-fertilised human ovum 
into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been 
transplanted, and any non-fertilised human ovum whose division 
and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis 
constitute a “human embryo”;
 – it is for the referring court to ascertain, in the light of scientific 
developments, whether a stem cell obtained from a human embr-
yo at the blastocyst stage constitutes a “human embryo” within the 
meaning of Article 6(2) (c) of Directive 98/44.
As far as the second and third questions, the Court of Justice ruled that 
the exclusion from patentability concerning the use of human embryos 
for industrial or commercial purposes set out in Article 6(2)(c) of Di-
rective 98/44 also covers the use of human embryos for purposes of 
scientific research, only for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which 
are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it being patentable. 
Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44 excludes an invention from paten-
tability where the technical teaching which is the subject-matter of the 
patent application requires the prior destruction of human embryos or 
their use as basematerial, whatever the stage at which that takes place 
and even if the description of the technical teaching claimed does not 
refer to the use of human embryos.
18 See the General Advocate’s Opinion of 10 March 2011, in the case C-34/10, especially 
paragraph 61 on the grounds exposed in previous paragraphs 54 to 60.
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Examining the reasoning followed by the Court of Justice one sees 
that before answering the three questions asked by the Bundesgerich-
tshof, the Court of Justice considered necessary to explain why such 
concept had to be defined autonomously and specifically for the Union 
Law.19 In its opinion, this followed from the wording and the purpose 
of Directive 98/44, a harmonization directive,20 and from the rules al-
ready developed by the Court in the initial case-law interpreting that 
legislation.21
 Entering into the merits of the questions referred for a preliminary 
ruling, it is a fact that Directive 98/44 gives no definition of the con-
cept of human embryo.22 Similarly, its drafting history does not give any 
indication of the intended substance of the concept. Consequently, the 
General Advocate looked for elements which could serve as guidance 
for his task, namely the legislation of the Member States, the provisions 
of the directive and current scientific information.
Searching in the legislation of the Member States would be in vain 
for finding evidence of a unanimous conception. The provisions of Di-
rective 98/44 provided an important indication: which follows from 
the wording and the approach taken by the directive leads us to define 
not life, but the human body. Consequently, it is the human body, at 
the various stages of its formation and development for which it de-
mands protection when it declares it expressly unpatentable.23 In other 
words, for the Court of Justice, as it also was for the General Advocate, 
the question to be asked would be what form, what stage of develop-
19 Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Judgment of 18 October 2011, in the Case C-34/10.
20  Paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Judgment of 18 October 2011, in the Case C-34/10. 
21  Paragraph 29 of the Judgment of 18 October 2011, in the Case C-34/10. According to 
settled case-law, the need for uniform application of Union law and the principle of equality 
require that the terms of a provision of Union law which makes no express reference to the 
law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally 
be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union.  Clearly, Article 
6(2)(c) of the Directive 98/44, which provides that uses of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes are to be considered unpatentable, makes no express reference to the 
law of the Member States. 
22 Paragraph 31 of the Judgment of 18 October 2011, in the Case C-34/10.
23 Paragraph 33 of the judgment of 18 October 2011, in the Case C-34/10. See also 
paragraph 77 of the Opinion of the General Advocate of 10 March 2011 in the case.
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ment of the human body, should be given the legal categorisation of 
‘embryo’. For this aim, the Union legislature has stressed the principle 
whereby inventions must be excluded from patentability where their 
commercial exploitation offends ordre public or morality and points out 
that those two concepts correspond in particular to ethical or moral 
principles recognised in a Member State. Finally, in conjunction with 
the above considerations, current scientific information —and the in-
ferences which can be drawn from its silences— cannot, at present, tell 
us when the human person truly begins24. In this ongoing process which 
commences with gamete fusion, is it possible to say this with indisput-
able scientific precision which is the only way to avoid ethical or moral 
questions. Put in this way, the question would then refer to a solution 
directly inspired by philosophical or religious considerations and would 
therefore seem impossible to formulate in a way which is acceptable to 
everyone.
In short, the General Advocate suggested —and he was followed by 
the Court of Justice— that it would be preferred to focus on the hu-
man body instead of considering the beginning of life. Consequently, 
the Court of Justice observed in paragraphs 34 to 37 of the judgment 
that Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44 should be interpreted to the ef-
fect that the concept of a human embryo applies from the fertilisation 
stage to the initial totipotent cells and to the entire ensuing process 
of the development and formation of the human body.25 In addition, 
unfertilised ova into which a cell nucleus from a mature human cell 
has been transplanted or whose division and further development have 
been stimulated by parthenogenesis are also included in the concept of 
a human embryo in so far as the use of such techniques would result in 
totipotent cells being obtained.26
24 Paragraph 81 of the Opinion of the General Advocate of 10 March 2011, in the Case 
C-34/10.
25 The next stage in the life of a human embryo occurs when the totipotent cells have given 
way to pluripotent cells (the blastocyst).
26 The reason as observed by the General Advocate was that “whilst, in themselves, 
totipotent cells hold the capacity to develop a complete human body, the blastocyst is the 
product of this capacity for development at a certain moment. It is therefore one of the aspects 
of the development of the human body and constitutes one of the stages.” See paragraphs 94 
and 95 of the Opinion of the General Advocate in the Case C-34/10.
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The Court of Justice seemed to think that it would be paradoxical to 
refuse legal categorisation as an embryo for the blastocyst, which is the 
product of the normal growth of the initial cells. This would essentially 
diminish the protection of the human body at a more advanced stage 
in its development. Any pluripotent cell in isolation could not there-
fore be regarded as constituting an embryo in itself. Taken individually, 
pluripotent embryonic stem cells are not included in the concept of 
Human Embryo because they do not in themselves have the capacity to 
develop into a human being. However, as Mr Brüstle explained in his 
observations to the Court, embryonic stem cells were obtained from 
the internal cellular mass of the blastocyst, which was then removed. In 
other words, it is an element of the human body, in the course of its 
development, which was therefore isolated in order to proliferate the 
cells contained in that cellular mass. According to the legal definition 
provided by the Court of Justice, an invention should be excluded from 
patentability, in accordance with Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/
EC whenever the application of the technical process for which the 
patent is filed necessitates the prior destruction of human embryos or 
their use as base material, even if the description of that process does 
not contain any reference to the use of human embryos.27 That was also 
the answer provided to the third question that the referring court asked 
the Court of Justice.28
As far as the second question referred for a preliminary ruling, the 
Court of Justice assumed the opinion that the General Advocate stated 
who had considered that making an industrial application of an inven-
tion using embryonic stem cells would amount to using human embryos 
as a simple base material. Such an invention would exploit the human 
body in the initial stages of its development.29 Thus, the Court of Justice 
stated that the only exception to the prohibition of patentability would 
be the uses and inventions for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which 
were applied to the human embryo and were useful to it.30
27 Paragraphs 98 and 101 of the Opinion of the General Advocate of 10 March 2011, in 
the Case C-34/10.
28 See paragraph 52 of the judgment of 18 October 2011, in the Case C-34/10.
29 Read paragraphs 47 to 50 of the judgment of 18 October 2011 in the Case C-34/10, 
in comparison to paragraph 110 of the Opinion of the General Advocate in the same case.
30 Paragraph 46 of the judgment of 18 October 2011, in the Case C-34/10.
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Iv. RELEvANCE Of THE juRIDICAL CONCEPTuALIsATION 
Of THE HuMAN EMbRyO IN THE EuROPEAN uNION LAW
1. Unreasonably expanding the ratio decidendi of the European Patent Office 
(EBoA) Decision of 25 November 2008 in the WARF case
Although the Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological in-
ventions (98/44/EC) regulates patentability of biological material, 
including Human Embryonic Stem Cells, it is also true that there is 
no European Union consensus on the moral status of embryo and its 
products. Consequently, reflecting this wide diversity of moral cultu-
res, there are different policies for patenting among national patent 
offices which may difficult to achieve a European patent consensus at 
this regards. The already referred European Groups on Ethics’ Opinion No. 
16 On Ethical aspects involving the patenting of human stem cells was a strong 
source of inspiration for the Main Board of Appellation (“EBoA”) in the 
European Patent Office in its decision of 25 November 2008 in the so 
called WARF case.31
It was a ruling in an appeal connected to the so-called WARF/Thom-
son stem cell application describing a method for obtaining embryonic 
stem cell cultures from primates, including humans, and was filed by 
the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) in 1995. In 2006, 
the Technical Board competent for the case referred it to the EBoA 
whose final decision was a refusal to grant a patent for an invention 
which necessarily involves the use and destruction of human embryos 
since it would be contrary to public order or morality in Europe, which 
was prohibited in the European Patent Convention and on the EU Bio-
technology Directive (98/44/EC). 
The decision of the Enlarged Board of Appellation of the European 
Patent Office was not a complete surprise. Certainly, it surprised many 
observers who could have expected a similar decision to that given in 
1992 to the patentability of the “Harvard Oncomouse”. Then, although 
31 Decision of the EboA (Use of embryos/WARF) of 25 November 2008, OJ EPO 2009, 
pp. 306 and ff.
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a controversial issue was at stake, the European Patent Office agreed 
that a mouse produced through the injection and incorporation of an 
oncogene into the embryo with the purpose to provide for research 
into cancer was patentable.32 The Decision was favourable because, as 
the European Patent Office stated:
In the case at hand three different interests are involved and require balancing: 
there is a basic interest of mankind to remedy widespread and dangerous diseases; 
on the other hand the environment has to be protected against the uncontrolled 
dissemination of unwanted genes and moreover, cruelty to animals has to be avoi-
ded. The latter two aspects may well justify regarding an invention as immoral 
and therefore unacceptable unless the advantages, i. e., the benefit to mankind, 
outweighs the negative aspects.33
It was not a complete unexpected decision, however, because under 
the cover of Article 7 of the Directive 98/44/CE of 6 July, 1998 con-
cerning the juridical protection of biotechnological inventions, the Eu-
ropean Group on Ethics had redacted in 2002 the Opinion No. 16, on the 
ethical aspects of patenting inventions involving human stem cells34. In this 
sense, it is relevant to recall what the European Group on Ethics’ stated in 
its Opinion No. 16:
The Group is well aware that all procedures involving directly or indirectly the hu-
man embryo are controversial in the sense that they are based on presuppositions 
for instance concerning the beginning of human life and the question whether 
there should be an absolute or a relative protection of human life in its different 
stages. Political and legal decisions in these ethical matters may change the self 
understanding of what it means to be a human being in a given epoch and society.
32 Decision of the European Patent Office No. 0 169762 (Onco.mouse/Harvard) 1992, 
OJ EPO 1992, pp. 588 and ff.
33 Ibidem, p. 591.
34 In this sense, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation issued a statement on November 
29, 2008, following the rejection of its stem cell patent claims before the European Patent 
Office: “... WARF emphasizes that this ruling by the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal was 
based on European Union patent rules that are peculiar to Europe. There is no counterpart in 
United States patent law and therefore the EPO decision does not in any way affect WARF’s 
patent rights in the United States...”.
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The question of the dignity and the moral status of the embryo remain indeed highly 
controversial in a pluralistic society as the European Union. Those who are opposed to 
human embryo research cannot, a fortiori, consider any patenting in that field. Among 
those who consider research on embryos ethically acceptable, some may feel great reluctance 
towards patenting the resulting inventions, while others consider patenting inventions deri-
ved from embryo research as acceptable, especially given their potential medical benefits...
There is at present a tendency to accept double morality where there is no 
coherence between different positions adopted by one country. For instance, one 
could expect that to consider research on human embryos to derive stem cells as 
unethical, might imply the prohibition of the import for research of embryonic 
stem cells derived from human embryos as well as of the use of potential thera-
peutically applications resulting from such research, which is not always the case35 
(Cursive is added).
We must not lose sight of the fact that the patent application No. 
96903521.136 described a method by which primate embryonic stem 
cells derived from an embryo could be maintained in vitro for a long pe-
riod of time without losing their potential to differentiate into any cell 
of the body. On 13 July 2004, an EPO examining Division refused to 
grant a patent for the application on the grounds that it was found to be 
not consistent with the European Patent Convention (EPC) essentially 
because the disclosed method of obtaining stem cells used as the star-
ting material a primate (including human) embryo which was destroyed 
in the process. In late 2005, the Technical Board of Appeal competent in 
the case referred the case to the EPO’s supreme judiciary body, the En-
larged Board of Appeal. The Enlarged Board of Appeal considered that 
under the European Patent Convention and the EU Biotechnological 
Directive 98/44/EC it is not possible to grant a patent for an invention 
which necessarily involves the use and destruction of human embryos. 
It must also be remembered that Article 53 —Exceptions to patentabi-
lity— of the EPC as amended by the Act revision the European Patent 
Convention of 29 November 200037 says that European patents shall 
35 EGE Opinion No. 16 of 7 May, 2002, op. cit., paragraph 1.21, p. 13. 
36 Published as EP Nr. 0770125 under the title “Primate embryonic stem cells” filed by the 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, WARF, in 1995.
37 See it in http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/epc.html (visited the 4th May 
2012).
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not be granted in respect of: “(a) inventions the commercial exploi-
tation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality; such 
exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is 
prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States.”
According to WARF, the opinion of the Enlarged Board of Appeal fo-
cused on the issue of the patentability of cells made using an embryo.38 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out the peculiarity of the European 
Patent System —including moral considerations — which make it dif-
ferent to the United States Patent system where there is no reference to 
moral objections to patentability of inventions, as it was mentioned at 
the very beginning of these pages. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, 
was observed by the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent 
Office in the WARF Case, 
... Article 53 a) EPC excludes inventions from patentability if their commercial 
exploitation is against ordre public or morality... In this context, it is important 
to point out that it is not the fact of the patenting itself that is considered to be 
against ordre public or morality, but it is the performing of the invention, which 
includes a step (the use involving its destruction of a human embryo) that has to 
be considered to contravene those concepts.39
In a word, for the EBoA of the European Patent Office there was nothing 
else to discuss, since this was the legal frame for patents in Europe. By 
saying these words, the EboA was concerned that in some European 
countries is possible to get patents in cases involving the destruction of 
human embryos to obtain cells, because in the societies of these coun-
tries the patentability of such inventions and their commercial exploi-
tation was not considered to be against the ordre public nor morality: 
38 “The Board made no determination of the patentability of claims based on any of the 
traditional criteria used to assess patentability: usefulness, novelty and non-obviousness. In 
fact, the opinion makes clear that its decision does not address the question of patentability 
in general of inventions relating to human stem cell cultures.” See, the statement issued by 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation on November 29, 2008, following the rejection of 
its stem cell patent claims before the European Patent Office.
39  Point 29 of the EBoA Decision of 25 November 2008 in the WARF case.
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... the legislators (both the legislator of the Implementing Regulations of the EPC 
and of the Directive) wanted to exclude inventions such as the one underlying this 
referral from patentability and that in doing so; they have remained within the 
scope of Article 53 a) EPC and of the TRIPS Agreement. In view of this result, it 
is not necessary nor indeed appropriate to discuss further arguments and points 
of view put forward in these proceedings such as whether the standard of ordre 
public or morality should be a European one or not, whether it matters if research in 
certain European countries involving the destruction of human embryos to obtain cells is 
permitted, whether the benefits of the invention for humanity should be balanced 
against the prejudice to the embryo, or what the point in time is to assess ordre 
public or morality under Article 53 a) EPC. The legislators have decided, remai-
ning within the ambit of Article 53 a) EPC, and there is no room for manoeuvre.40 
(Cursive is added)
According to the ratio decidendi of the WARF decision, researchers in 
those countries would keep on their research because, not at Euro-
pean but at least at national level and in the United States as well, they 
could get legal protection for their inventions. The main consequence 
of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 October 2011 in the case 
C-34/10 seems to be that from now on, not even at national level these 
researchers would get access to patent related to Human Embryos nor 
Human Embryonic cells when obtaining them the destruction of the 
Human Embryo is inevitable. The consequences for those researchers 
in next future are far from being blooming: stop researching in Europe, 
re start for some of them oversea.
 
2. Unjustifically ignoring the Opinions of the EGE and the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights
What human dignity means remains a mystery in Europe due to the plu-
ralism which characterizes its society. I has already referred to the up-
to-now authorized doctrine on the topic: the European Group on Ethics 
(EGE) Opinion No. 16 on the ethical aspects of patenting inventions involving 
40  Point 31 of the EBoA Decision of 25 November 2008 in the WARF case.
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human stem cells.41 On its own, the European Court of Human Rights has 
dealt with eventual connotations of the principle of human dignity as 
regards the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, of 11th November 1950,42 adopting a very 
cautious approach to this issue. In fact, the pluralism of juridical orders 
is one of the main features of the European society and this fact is con-
sistently recalled by the European Court of Human Rights when it has 
to interpret and implement dispositions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights or its Additional Protocols. 
As far as the conception of the beginning of human life and its ju-
ridical implications, two sets of judgments seem to be of particular rel-
evance. The first one, dealing with the nature and juridical condition of 
a human foetus is a judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights, of 8th July 2004 in the case Vo versus France. The 
second one deals with human embryos and is represented by judgments 
of 7th March 2006 (Chamber) and 10th April 2007 (Grand Chamber) 
of the European Court, both given in the case Evans versus United King-
dom.
The European Court of Human Rights, ruling as a Grand Chamber, 
said previously the same with different words in 2004 in the case of VO 
v. France43. Then, the European Court considered that the issue of when 
the right to life begins is a question to be decided at national level: 
firstly, because the issue has not been decided within the majority of the 
States which had ratified the Convention, in particular in France, where 
this question has been the subject of public debate; and, secondly, be-
41  See supra epigraph II.
42  ETS No. 5 as modified by Additional Protocol No. 14, in force since 1st June 2010, 
CETS No. 194.
43 Judgment of 8 July, 2004. The case concerned an application brought by a French 
national, Mrs Thi-Nho Vo, who attended on 27 November 1991 the Lyons general Hospital 
for a medical examination scheduled during the six month of pregnancy. On the same day 
another woman, Mrs Thi Thanh Van Vo, was due to have a coil removed at the same hospital. 
Owing to a mix-up caused by the fact that both women shared the same surname, the 
doctor who examined the applicant pierced her amniotic sac, making a therapeutic abortion 
necessary. Having exhausted local remedies, Mrs Thi-Nho VO lodged an application before 
the European Court complaining of the authorities’ refusal to classify the unintentional killing 
of her unborn child as involuntary homicide, relying on Article 2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.
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cause there is no European consensus on the scientific and legal defini-
tion of the beginning of life. It also established that:
At European level, there is no consensus on the nature and status of the embryo 
and/or foetus. At best, it can be regarded as common ground between States that 
the embryo/foetus belonged to the human race, its potential and capacity to be-
come a person requires protection in the name of human dignity, without making 
it a person with the right to life for the purpose of Article 2.44
The same conclusion was achieved two years later in the case Evans v. Uni-
ted Kingdom, judgments of 7 March, 2006 (Chamber) and of 10 April, 
2007 (Grand Chamber).45 In both judgments the European Court of 
Human Rights refused to recognise eventually the right to life under 
Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights to human em-
bryos. Furthermore, this Court even self-restrained of willing to judge 
at European level on the question concerning the beginning of human 
life, considering the wide margin of appreciation any European country 
has been given on the matter.
As far as the facts of the case, on 10 October 2000 the applicant and 
J were informed, during an appointment at the clinic that preliminary 
tests had revealed that the applicant had serious pre-cancerous tumors 
in both ovaries, and that her ovaries would have to be removed. They 
were told that because the tumors were growing slowly, it would be 
possible first to extract some eggs for in vitro fertilization (“IVF”).  On 
12 November 2001 the couple attended the clinic and eleven eggs were 
harvested and fertilized. Six embryos were created and consigned to 
storage. On 26 November the applicant underwent an operation to re-
move her ovaries. She was told that she should wait two years before 
attempting to implant any of the embryos in her uterus. In May 2002 
the relationship broke up. The future of the embryos was discussed be-
tween the parties. On 4 July 2002 J wrote to the clinic to notify it of the 
44 Paragraphs 82 and ff. of the Judgment. The European Court of Human Rights also 
remembered that not even the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 1997 
(Oviedo Convention) nor its Additional Protocol of 2005 concerning Biomedical Research 
include a definition of human being or of a person.
45 See paragraphs 45 to 47 in the former and paragraphs 54 to 56 in the latter.
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separation and to state that the stock of embryos should be destroyed. 
Since that moment, a legal battle started between both parts reaching 
the European Court of Human Right’s judgment of 7 March 2006.
Before the European Court the applicant claimed that the relevant 
provisions of the 1990 Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, which 
required her former partner’s consent before the embryos made with 
their joint genetic material can be implanted in her uterus, violate her 
rights under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, and the embryos’ 
right to life under Article 2.
Concerning the alleged violation of Article 2 of the European Con-
vention, the Court recalled in paragraph 46 of his judgment what has 
already observed in Vo v. France,46 that, in the absence of any European 
consensus on the scientific and legal definition on the beginning of life, 
the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of ap-
preciation which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy 
in this sphere. Under English law an embryo does not have independent 
rights or interests and cannot claim —or have claimed on its behalf— a 
right to life under Article 2. Consequently, there had not been a viola-
tion of that provision in the present case.47 As far the rest of her allega-
tion relating Articles 8 and 14, the European Court’s assessment was 
the following to finally reach the conclusion that it had not been viola-
tion of Article 8 (held by five votes against two) nor of Article 14 (held 
unanimously).
The Court observed at the outset that since “private life” is a broad 
term, it incorporates the right to respect for both the decisions to be-
46 Grand Chamber, no. 53924/00, § 82, ECHR 2004. The European Court had considered 
that the issue of when the right to life begins is a question to be decided at national level: 
firstly, because the issue has not been decided within the majority of the States which had 
ratified the Convention, in particular in France, where this question has been the subject 
of public debate; and, secondly, because there is no European consensus on the scientific 
and legal definition of the beginning of life. It asserted that “At European level, there is no 
consensus on the nature and status of the embryo and/or foetus. At best, it can be regarded 
as common ground between States that the embryo/foetus belonged to the human race, its 
potential and capacity to become a person requires protection in the name of human dignity, 
without making it a person with the right to life for the purpose of Article 2.”
47 Paragraph 47 of the judgment of 7 March 2006.
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come and not to become a parent.48 The 1990 Act prevented the clinic 
from treating the applicant once J had withdrawn his consent. Thus, 
for the European Court, the question which arises is whether there 
exists a positive obligation on the State to ensure that a woman who 
has embarked on treatment for the specific purpose of giving birth to a 
genetically related child should be permitted to proceed with the im-
plantation of the embryo notwithstanding the withdrawal of consent 
by her former partner, the male gamete provider.49 To give an answer, 
the European Court firstly, observed that there is no international con-
sensus with regard to the regulation of IVF treatment or to the use of 
embryos created by such treatment.50 Thus, even though the great sym-
pathy for the plight of the applicant who, if implantation did not take 
place, would be deprived of the ability to give birth to her own child, 
the European Court did not consider contrary to Article 8 the 1990 Act 
which did not have a power to national authorities to override a genetic 
parent’s withdrawal of consent. 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which 
have contributed to confirm the European pluralism regarding the be-
ginning of human life and the concept of human being defended by 
the European Group of Ethics seems to have been over passed in an 
unjustifiable way by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 18 October 
2011. It should be mentioned in passing that even the Enlarged Board 
of Appeal of the European Patent Office (EBoA) —having to pronounce 
itself on the meaning of human embryo in the so called WARF case—, 
concluded that what is an embryo is a question of fact in the context of 
any particular patent application.51 In a similar approach, the General 
48 Paragraph 57 of the judgment of 7 March 2006.
49 Paragraph 58 of the judgment of 7 March 2006.
50 Paragraphs 61 and 62 of the judgment. In this context declared the European Court 
that: “Since the use of IVF treatment gives rise to sensitive moral and ethical issues against 
a background of fast-moving medical and scientific developments, and since the questions 
raised by the case touch on areas where there is no clear common ground amongst the 
Member States, the Court considers that the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the 
respondent State must be a wide one”. 
51 Points 19 and 20 of the EBoA Decision of 25 November 2008 in the WARF case: “The 
European Union and the EPC legislators must presumably have been aware of the definitions 
used in national laws on regulating embryos, and yet chose to leave the term undefined. Given 
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Advocate in his Opinion in the preliminary ruling in the Case C-34/10 
adopted a cautious position when he observed that :
... It also worth pointing out that the legal definition which I will propose falls 
within the framework of the technical directive under examination and that, in 
my view, legal inferences cannot also be drawn for other areas which relate to 
human life, but which are on an entirely different level and fall outside the scope 
of Union law. For that reason, I consider that the reference made at the hearing 
to judgments delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on the subject 
of abortion is, by definition, outside the scope of our subject. It is not possible 
to compare the question of the possible use of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes with national laws which seek to provide solutions to indi-
vidual difficult situations.52
This is also the intention of the Court of Justice when it stated that:
As regards the meaning to be given to the concept of ‘human embryo’ set out in 
Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive, it should be pointed out that, although, the de-
finition of human embryo is a very sensitive social issue in many Member States, 
marked by their multiple traditions and value systems, the Court is not called 
upon, by the present order for reference, to broach questions of a medical or 
ethical nature, but must restrict itself to a legal interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Directive.53 
I think that both, the General Advocate and the Court of Justice are 
terribly wrong when they consider that it will be enough for resolving 
such a controverted issue like human dignity is, to distinguish between 
a commercial and a private use of human embryos, taking for granted 
the purpose to protect human dignity and prevent the commercialisation of embryos, the 
Enlarged Board can only presume that ‘embryo’ was not to be given any restrictive meaning 
in Rule 28, formerly 23 d) EPC, as to do so would undermine the intention of the legislator, 
and that what is an embryo is a question of fact in the context of any particular patent application.” 
(Cursive is added)
52 Paragraph 49 of the Opinion of the General Advocate of 10 March 2011 in the Case 
C-34/10.
53 Paragraph 30 of the judgment of 18 October 2011 in the Case C-34/10.
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that in the former case is possible an European approach whereas in 
the latter is preferable a national and particularised position. In both 
cases there are questions of moral and public order for which Euro-
pean Union Law hardly can provide solution without a political will of 
legislators at national and supranational level. In this sense, I find par-
ticularly relevant the statement of the General Advocate when says in 
paragraph 90 in fine of his Opinion:
... Directive 98/44 does state that a practice is not contrary to ordre public merely 
because it is prohibited by the Member State. The assessment with regard to ordre 
public must be made having regard to the rules laid down in the directive. What is 
authorised by the directive could no longer be prohibited by national law.
Thus, the main consequence of this démarche of the Court of Justice in 
the case C-34/10 is that the conceptualisation of human embryo in the 
European Union Law implies to put a limit to the margin of discretion 
held up to now by Member States as to individually manage moral and 
public order considerations to grant biotechnological patents at natio-
nal level and also to opposite they being granted at European level. In 
my opinion, the judicial conceptualization of the Human Embryo in the 
Law of the European Union can be described as a well-aimed step in the 
wrong direction. It is a judgment inconsistent with the current situation 
of European countries showing an effective normative divergence in the 
field of Human Embryonic research. A true European convergence in 
matter of embryonic research, at least at level of informing principles, 
seems a previous condition sine qua non for a harmonisation in Europe 
as regards biotechnological patents implying Human Embryos54. The 
inexistence of such informing principles could be interpreted as an ex-
pression of the European legislator’s desire of respecting the margin 
of appreciation of European Members to regulate research in this field 
at their will, considering the moral and public order considerations of 
their own societies. Is this interpretation correct, hardly would a real 
European harmonization on patents could be reached to protect the re-
sults of such researching only by way of the Court of Justice judgment 
of 18 October 2011.
54 The General Advocate recognized in paragraph 44 of his opinion the close relation 
between research and patent regimes.
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v. quEsTIONs uNREsOLvED WITH THE NEW DéMARCHE: EMbRyOs 
DERIvED fROM CELLuLAR REPROgRAMMINg TECHNIquEs WITH 
sOMATIC NuCLEAR TRANsfER (sOMATIC EMbRyOs)
As a matter of fact, it is true that the aim of activating ovocite with 
nuclear transfer of adult somatic reprogrammed cells is not to create 
human embryos but an embryonic body, something different.55 This is 
so understood by most of authors56 but not unanimously.57 However, 
Science keeps advancing at present rate making possible to create hu-
man pre-embryos and embryos with the technique of nuclear transfer 
of adult reprogrammed cells which would be totipotent and not only 
pluripotent. For example, Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells (iPSCs) can 
be injected by micropipette into a trophoblast and the blastocyst being 
transferred to recipient females. Chimerical living mouse pups could 
be created: mice with iPSCs derivatives incorporated all across their 
bodies with 10%-90% chimeras. Consequently, a dilemma would rise 
in countries like United Kingdom and Spain.58 We consider here the 
general sense of totipotency, as the General Advocate did in his opinion 
in the Case C-34/10, like the ability of a single cell to generate an en-
55 Human Embryonic stem cells naturally reside within the inner cell mass (embryo blast) 
of blastocyst, and in the embryo blast, they differentiate into the embryo while the blastocyst’s 
shell (trophoblast) differentiates into extra embryonic tissues. The hollow trophoblast is 
unable to form a living embryo and thus it is necessary for the embryonic stem cells within 
the embryo blast to differentiate and form the embryo.
56 See, for instance, López Moratalla, N., “Clonación terapéutica”, Persona y Bioética, Vol. 
8, No. 22, 2004.
57 See as this regards, Znidarsic, V., “Biomedical research in Andalusia: a critical approach 
from Slovenia”, in Régimen Jurídico de la investigación biomédica en Andalucía (Daniel García San 
José coord.) Ed. Laborum, 2009, pp. 205-206.
58 The Autonomous Community of Andalusia has competence under Spanish Constitution 
and its Statute to develop research on human cells. See Andalusian Act 1/2007, of 16 March 
2007, of researching in cellular reprogramming exclusively for therapeutic purposes in 
Andalusia, BOE No. 89, 13 April 2007, pp. 16299 to 16302 (it can be consulted into English 
in http://www.grupo.us.es/biodeinter). At national level, Biomedical research is regulated 
in Spanish Act 14/2007, 3 July 2007, of biomedical research in Spain, BOE No. 159, 4 July 
2007 (it can be consulted into English in http://www.catedraderechoygenomahumano.es/
int_normativa.asp (visited the 4th May 2012)
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tire individual.59 In such case, Autonomic commissions and committees 
with competence in this field, namely the Committee of Researching 
in Cellular Reprogramming could make a literal interpretation of Act 
1/2007 and consider that nuclear transfer of adult somatic reprogram-
med cells are authorised even in case of human pre-embryo (still called 
somatic pre-embryo) is created exclusively for therapeutic purpose. 
That is, not just to germinate specific lines of stem cells but any hu-
man body cell and thus, ready to derive in chimerical embryos, as it 
successfully happened in China in 2009 with chimerical mice. As it was 
worldwide commented,60 Chinese scientists published in the summer of 
2009 two works in the journals Nature61 and Cell Stem Cell62 where they 
asserted to have created live mice from mature skin cells that had re-
verted to an embryonic-like state. There is little doubt that such scien-
tific success could overlap controversy surrounding somatic embryonic 
stem cells putting at the same ground than Human Embryonic stem 
cells as not being object of patent in Europe.
vI. fOREsEEAbLE CONsEquENCEs Of THE juRIDICAL 
CONCEPTuALIsATION Of HuMAN EMbRyO 
IN THE EuROPEAN uNION LAW
The Court of Justice of the European Union had affirmed in past that 
the fundamental right to human dignity was part of the European Union 
59 See Testa, G., Borghese, L., Steinbeck, J. A. and Brüstle, O., “Breakdown of the 
Potentiality Principle and Its Impact on Global Stem Cell Research”, Cell Stem Cell 1, 2007, 
pp. 153-156.
60 See, i.e. The Washington Post, July 24, 2009.
61 The work of the team of scientists led by Qi Zhou of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was 
published in Nature vol. 460, No. 7254, July 23, 2009: 37 iPS cell lines created, three of 
which produced 27 live offspring, the first of which they named Tiny. One of the offspring, a 
7-week-old male, went on to impregnate a female and produced young of its own.
62 The work of the team of researchers led by Shaorong GAO of the National Institute of 
Biological Sciences in Beijing appeared published in Cell Stem Cell, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 135-138, 23 
July 2009: five iPS cell lines, one of which was able to produce embryos that survived until 
birth. Four animals were born but only one lived to adulthood.
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Law and as a legitimate interest which must be protected by the Euro-
pean Union itself and by its member States even if such protection is 
in contradiction with European Law dispositions.63 Thus, it seems of 
particular relevance the paragraph No. 96 of the General Advocate’s 
Opinion where he said that “... Human dignity is a principle which must 
be applied not only to an existing human person, to a child who has 
been born, but also to the human body from the first stage in its deve-
lopment, i.e. from fertilisation”.
In my opinion such statement, not reproduced in the judgment of the 
Court of Justice of 18 October 2011 but inferring the whole reason-
ing followed by it, does not seem to be the best way to put an end to a 
discussion opened for the latest years in Europe. In effect, the unique 
Interpretative Declaration added to States signatures of the Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine on the 
Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings (ETS No. 168) was that of The 
Netherlands. It concerned the words “dignity of human beings” in Ar-
ticle 1 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ETS No. 
164), as referred in last paragraph of the Preamble of this Additional 
Protocol.64 In opinion of this country, the words “human dignity” in 
both texts, Convention and Protocol, were only referring to the dignity 
of any human being; that is, the dignity of a born person. The purpose 
of this interpretative declaration was evident: to let clear that The Neth-
erlands stayed apart from other countries, like the Holy See,65 which in-
voked human dignity of the human being in a wide sense, like a species 
and thus including human embryos.
63 Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council (2001) ECR I-7079, 
paragraphs 70 and ff.. Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs GmbH v. 
Obergurgermeiterin der Bundesstadt Bonn (2004) ECR I-9609, paragraphs 30 to 35. Case 
C-456/03, Commission v. Italy (2005) ECR I-5335.
64 In the Preamble of the Additional Protocol one can read “Considering the purpose of 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, in particular the principle mentioned 
in Article 1 aiming to protect the dignity and identity of all human beings.” Article 1 of the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine states: “Parties to this Convention shall protect 
the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, 
respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the 
applications of biology and medicine”.
65 See “Clonage et recherche embryonnaire”, La documentation catholique, No. 2261, 2002. 
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Such Interpretative Declaration by The Netherlands hardly would be 
compatible with the sense given to “human beings” in the Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine where it is combined —without 
confusion— “person” (any particular and individual human being) and 
the “human beings”, as including the human life in all its forms, em-
bryonic and already born. Thus, the word “person” is used here with a 
similar meaning as it is employed in the European Convention for the 
Protection of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of 11th 
November, 1950. That is, as referring to those who are subject of Law, 
with rights and duties? The words “human beings”, on the contrary, is 
used in the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine meaning hu-
man life in all its forms to bring protection to human dignity and iden-
tity since the very moment of conception. Consequently, Article 13 of 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on interventions on 
the human genome gains a practical meaning. Nevertheless, it was let as 
an open question the meaning of human dignity in the Explanatory Report 
to the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings which recognised in point 6: 
“In conformity with the approach followed in the preparation of the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, it was decided to leave 
it to domestic law to define the scope of the expression ‘human being’ 
for the purposes of the application of the present Protocol”. 
Furthermore, it may be interesting to recall that in the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union, in Chapter I (Dignity) it is made 
a reference to human rights facing cloning in Article 3 (right to physi-
cal integrity)66 and not in Article 2 (right to life).67 Thus, it could seem 
The Holy See took part in the drafting of this Additional Protocol although it finally did not 
sign it.
66 Article 3. Right to the integrity of the person. “1. Everyone has the right to respect for 
his or her physical and mental integrity. 2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following 
must be respected in particular: - the free and informed consent of the person concerned, 
according to the procedures laid down by law; - the prohibition of eugenic practices, in 
particular those aiming at the selection of persons, - the prohibition of making the human 
body and its parts as such a source of financial gain- the prohibition of the reproductive 
cloning of human beings.”
67 Article 2. Right to life: “1. Everyone has the right to life. 2. No one shall be condemned 
to the death penalty or executed”. Note that it is immediately after Article 1. Human dignity: 
“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected”.
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argued that for the drafters of this legally binding iinternational instru-
ment in Europe after the Lisbon Treaty, that dignity refers to a person, 
namely, any born person and not to the human being, like specie, in the 
widest sense of any human life whatever conception one might have of 
it. The judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 October 2011 implies 
that the protection of human dignity cover not only that of the born 
person but also that of the unborn person, that is, in stage of Human 
Embryo. Member States have to accept what probably they could de-
scribe as an unreasonable excersise of judicial activism. Nevertheless, 
it will still be room for controversy because the Court of Justice and 
the General Advocate have not specified the grounds for the protection 
of the dignity of the Human Embryo, that is, like a consequence of its 
moral status or of its moral value, two different things. Authors like 
Bonnie STEINBOCK, prefer to assert that very early, extra corporeal 
embryos do not have moral status but moral value, consequently, any 
human embryo is to be respected and cannot be treated as ‘stuff’ of 
no moral significance.68 The distinction this author proposes between 
moral status and moral value concerns the kind of reasons invoked for 
such respect: whereas in the moral status, protection for respect stems 
from their interest or welfare, in the moral value this is not possible 
because human embryos are non sentient beings (like works of arts, 
ancient oaks, wilderness areas and so on). The inevitable conclusion, 
therefore, is that due respect to human embryos as a form of human 
life is secured using them only for morally significant purposes, such as 
enabling infertile people to become parents and in research that could 
cure devastating diseases or save lives.69
68 Steinbock, B., “Moral Status, Moral Value and Moral Embryos: Implications for Stem 
Cell Research”, in Steinbock, Bonnie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, p. 433.
69 Ibidem, p. 438. In this example, author argues that medical research having the potential 
to prolong and improve people’s lives is at least as valuable as enabling infertile people to 
become parents, in order to which many of embryos that are created are not used to establish 
a pregnancy, but are frozen and ultimately discarded. Nothing to object the justification for 
the creation of excess embryos is to spare the woman several rounds of superovulatory drugs, 
which is both physically burdensome and expensive. Nevertheless, let’s apply for the similar 
treatment in medical research.
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vII. CONCLuDINg REMARks
It is particularly true in the field of Biotechnology that Science moves 
faster than Law, always lagging behind the facts.70 In Europe it does not 
exist at present a common conception of the beginning of human life, 
let alone as regards the margin of discretion Sates should have in regula-
ting the research with Human Embryos and to protect with patents the 
results of such research. The decision on appeal of the European Patent 
Office in the so called WARF Case, of 25 November 2008, is expression 
of the principle of the gradual conception of the human life protection 
and of the prohibition in Europe of destroying human embryos to get 
human embryonic stem cells. In its proper measure, the EPO decision 
showed that it is not allowed to patent at European level the process 
of creation of a human embryo specifically to the purposes of experi-
mentation and research. Although this may be allowed in United Sta-
tes with private founds, or in some European countries which are not 
bounded by Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention), such a research implying the 
creation-destruction of human embryos finds out a solid opposition in 
part of the European Society under moral grounds. Consequently, the 
patentability at European level of this kind of inventions would not be 
possible under Article 6 of the European Directive on patentability of 
biotechnological inventions and considering Article 53 a) of the EPC, 
as it was remarked by the European Group on Ethics in its Opinion No. 16 
of 7 May, 2002 on the Ethical Aspects of Patenting Inventions involving 
Human Stem Cells.
The situation of variable geometry in Europe as regards regulation of 
researching in human embryonic stem cells is a reality71 with unknown 
70 See in this sense the crucial statement made by the General Advocate in paragraph 
48 of his Opinion of 11 March 2011 in the Case C-34/10: “Consequently, in my view, the 
solution which I propose or the solution adopted by the Court will apply only at the time it is 
established. Advances in knowledge may lead to it being modified in future.”
71 EGE, Recommendations on the ethical review of hESC FP7 research projects, Opinion Nº 22, 
2007, p. 32. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-ethics/publications/opinions/
index_en.htm (visited the 4th May 2012).
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consequences. As already said, the main ground for criticising the judg-
ment of the Court of Justice in its judgment of 18 October 2011 is two 
folds: on the one hand, it unreasonably expands the ratio decidendi of the 
European Patent Office (EBoA) Decision of 25 November 2008 in the 
WARF case and the consequence is that not even at national level patents 
related to Human Embryonic stem cells will be allow for being contrary 
to the European Union Law. On the other hand, it unjustifiably ignores 
the Opinions of the EGE and the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights which have been fully respectful with the expressed 
will of European countries to be let a margin of appreciation at this 
regard. The conceptualisation of the Human Embryo in the European 
Union Law puts an end to the margin of discretion traditionally held 
by Member States for considering moral and public order constraints 
at national level to opposite the granting of biotechnological patents at 
European level. Nevertheless, this new démarche would have, neverthe-
less, very little consequences into the current situation of European 
patents if it is not followed by an effective normative convergence in 
the Human Embryonic research at European level, at least, at level of 
informing principles.
These informing principles would seem necessary for a true Euro-
pean convergence in matter of embryonic research as a previous condi-
tion for a harmonisation in Europe as regards biotechnological patents 
implying Human Embryos. 
Considering the particular situation of European countries like Unit-
ed Kingdom or Spain, although researching with induced pluripotent 
stem cells seems to overlap moral objections to nuclear transfer tech-
niques which imply destroying early-stage embryos, the key stone of 
the matter is the lack of a European common conception of human life 
and concerning the beginning of human life. It is reasonable to think 
that there is a risk that the distinction between somatic and human em-
bryos, depending on cellular reprogramming or human cloning tech-
niques, will be weaker and weaker in future. The works of two Chinese 
scientist teams published in 2009 in Nature and in Cell Stem Cell noticing 
to have created live mice from mature skin cells that they had reverted 
to an embryonic-like state, should be seen as an evidence of such a risk. 
Furthermore, even though what it is at stake is a somatic embryo and 
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not properly a human embryo, Science makes possible cellular repro-
gramming techniques without being necessary the method of somatic 
nuclear transfer, as it is applied in Spain. Consequently, situation in near 
future might be particularly worrying in the case of trying to patent the 
inventions resulting from research currently developed, considering 
the binding guidelines provided by the judgment of 18 October 2011 
of the Court of Justice and the ruling of the Enlarged Board of Appeal 
of the European Patent Office in the so called WARF case concerning 
patentability of biotechnological inventions implying the use of human 
embryos. That is, refusing to grant European patents protection for any 
controverted technique considered contrary to public morals and hu-
man dignity of the European society were to be proved the existence 
of less morally controverted techniques. As a matter of fact, these tech-
niques already do exist. In Science Daily72 it could be read in its edition of 
12 February 2008: “University of California —Los Angeles Stem Cell 
Scientists has reprogrammed human skin cells into cells with the same 
unlimited properties as embryonic stem cells without using embryos or 
eggs—.73 Further works published in 2009 confirmed this point.74 The 
situation we envisage in the near future is particularly worrying in the 
case of the research at present being done in Europe, even more consid-
ering planned research for next years.
72 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080211172631.htm. 
73 As it could be read in this piece of news, the UCLA study confirmed the work first 
reported in late November 2008 of researcher Shinya Yamanaka at Kyoto University and James 
Thomson at the University of Wisconsin. Taken together, the three studies demonstrated that 
human iPS cells could be easily created by different laboratories and were likely to mark a 
milestone in stem cell-based regenerative medicine: “Besides these new techniques to develop stem 
cells could potentially replace a controversial method used to reprogram cells, somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(SCNT), sometimes referred to as therapeutic cloning.” (Cursive is added). 
74 See, e.g. the work of Honguan Zhou, Shili Wu, Jin Young Joo, and others, published in Cell 
Stem Cell 4, May 8, 2009, pp. 381-384 (http://www.cell.com/cell-stem-cell/supplemental/
S1934-5909(09)00159-3 In this study scientists have demonstrated that somatic cells (in the 
case, murine fibroblasts) could be fully reprogrammed into pluripotent stem cells by direct 
delivery of recombinant reprogramming proteins. 
